Police Break The Law, Marijuana in Texas

Totoe said:

So the bastardized religion you created from fruit of the gods and a hindu scripture does not count either, dipshit.

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I didn't create any religions, dipshit

And fruit of the Gods has nothing to do with m religion. It just outlines religious sacrament, and was seen and asked about by the police. Who then arrested us.

You claim to use drugs as a sacrament and asked for one of the Vedas. I doubt you practice traditional Hinduism and figure you came up with your own version. Hinduism lends itself to this sort of practice with its pantheon and loose traditions which vary regionally. This is what I mean by you created your religion. Less l Ron Hubbard created and more silly offshoot of a real religion. Would you care to outline some of your practices?

Totoe said:

I doubt you practice traditional Hinduism and figure you came up with your own version.

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You're ASSUMPTIONS are wrong. I worship the traditional Shiva in the way of the current Hindu people. Sorry to disappoint. I outlined two practices already that will prove this not even including smoking) and can list more. But I will only list these two since you could have found them yourself. I read the Veda, the RIG Veda (which is just about Shiva) and I wear a Rudrashka Mala, which is "traditional Hindu" and practiced globally. I do MUCH more for Shiva than that, but those are two I can point out and say, you should have read better

Your* don't call someone a dunce when you can't even use proper grammar.
I just assumed from your half assed understanding of legal doctrine that it applied to your religious beliefs. Good luck, hire a lawyer or you will get creamed.

Totoe said:

Your* don't call someone a dunce when you can't even use proper grammar.
I just assumed from you half assed understanding of legal doctrine that it applied to your religious beliefs. Good luck, hire a lawyer or you will get creamed.

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I Double Dunced you.

Dude, you cited lemon, a case that pertains to government funding of religiously based organizations. Think in terms of something like Baylor medical center. It is a baptist school but because of the public good potential of the med center the government can issue bonds, grants etc to help fund various projects within the institution so long as entanglement is minimal. How in the fuck does this apply to you?

Totoe said:

A. you need 5 supreme court justices not one.
B. The drug in question of the case Peyote is not what I mean, they will apply the denial of peyote use to all illegal drugs as religious sacraments
C. Rastafarianism is older than 40 years and you cannot grow dreadlocks and smoke weed claiming it as a religious sacrament, so you cannot bastardize eastern religions with the same intent.
D. If you plan to seriously fight this and win, hire a lawyer who is sympathetic to your cause. go to norml.org or something because the DA is gonna destroy you. Its really simple, think in terms of athletics. you can't read a few books on how to play basketball then go beat even the 14th man for the toronto raptors, likewise two lexisnexus searches are not going to enable you to defeat a DA and a probably biased-already Texas judge.

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Dude, don't bother. He was asking for help in another thread and when people responded with the facts, he ignores them. We have told him time and again that he is correct, by law, he should be able to use cannabis as a sacrament. The issue is that the current courts in the US don't recognize this argument, legitimate or not. All of the evidence of his religion is completely irrelevant when the laws of this land has set precedent against his legal argument. No one disagrees with him that he SHOULD be able to use cannabis legally, but those of us that have actually looked at the legal history understand that in Amerika today, they will ignore this aspect of the Constitution.
I posted the following video from NORML's founder and legal counsel, someone fighting for these rights for decades, and he blew it off as not applying to him. Shinfaggy is in his own little delusional world. All of his threads get 1-starred since reading them kills neurons and makes everyone stupider for reading his diatribes. He attacks those of us that actually are on his side and legitimately trying to teach him things so he doesn't have to experience the negative consequences for himself, but if he needs to find out he is wrong on his own, then so be it.

Here's the video I'm talking about

[video=youtube;fhx46dKBO60]http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=fhx46dKBO60[/video]

I never asked for help. I asked if anyone reading had a similar case to mine, or could put me in contact with people with similar cases. You guys just took it to mean "Please help". I NEVER asked for anyone's help on my case in that thread. You guys just trolled the shit out of me.

ive never seen a person that NOT ONE person likes stick around a forum so long, if people treated me like this on my own threads i would leave RIU.

aknight3 said:

ive never seen a person that NOT ONE person likes stick around a forum so long, if people treated me like this on my own threads i would leave RIU.

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Once the trolls get tired you'll see the posts from the people that like me. I've been here long enough to know when the trolls come out to play, everyone else shuts up and goes away. Ya'll are just having like a 4 month holiday with my grow

Totoe said:

Dude, you cited lemon, a case that pertains to government funding of religiously based organizations. Think in terms of something like Baylor medical center. It is a baptist school but because of the public good potential of the med center the government can issue bonds, grants etc to help fund various projects within the institution so long as entanglement is minimal. How in the fuck does this apply to you?

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Bump for reply. I still want to get schooled about legal doctrine by someone who has never taken a law class.

Totoe said:

Dude, you cited lemon, a case that pertains to government funding of religiously based organizations. Think in terms of something like Baylor medical center. It is a baptist school but because of the public good potential of the med center the government can issue bonds, grants etc to help fund various projects within the institution so long as entanglement is minimal. How in the fuck does this apply to you?

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It's not hard to figure it out if you read my post. In the Lemon case, the REASON the ruling went the way it did, and the "common law" that was passed down based on that case is: 1) Government MUST act with secular purpose 2) its primary purpose must not be to inhibit or to advance religion; 3) there must be no excessive entanglement between government and religion.
ALL of these SUPREME COURT RULINGS were violated. Maybe next time try reading before making yourself look like a tard.

Totoe said:

Bump for reply. I still want to get schooled about legal doctrine by someone who has never taken a law class.

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Done.

some ppl are just stupid assholes lol coughfinshaggycough ....... thats why they troll you

Finshaggy said:

It's not hard to figure it out if you read my post. In the Lemon case, the REASON the ruling went the way it did, and the "common law" that was passed down based on that case is: 1) Government MUST act with secular purpose 2) its primary purpose must not be to inhibit or to advance religion; 3) there must be no excessive entanglement between government and religion.
ALL of these SUPREME COURT RULINGS were violated. Maybe next time try reading before making yourself look like a tard.

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lemon, a case that pertains to government funding of religiously based organizations. Think in terms of something like Baylor medical center. It is a baptist school but because of the public good potential of the med center the government can issue bonds, grants etc to help fund various projects within the institution so long as entanglement is minimal.

This does not apply to you. You need to understand that common law, particularly supreme court rulings, pertain to certain very specific sets of circumstances. Lemon does not apply to yours in anyway. I would be surprised if the DA and Judge do not laugh when you bring it up. You did not show anywhere an excessive entanglement with religion anyways. Jesus H. Fuckin Christ. This is ridiculous.

Totoe said:

lemon, a case that pertains to government funding of religiously based organizations.

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True, Lemon WAS a case that pertained to funding. But it's RULINGS (i.e. The only thing that matters in the end) were purely about religion and government interaction. No monetary ruling was made in the part that carries on as common law, the ruling simply CAN BE applied to reigio-government monetary situations. It is not limited to those situations, due to the wording. Look into "Black's Law Dictionary" before you reply.

Why would I look into that shit when I can access the case itself. You realize these types of publications are the equivalent of a "law for dummies" book, right? There is a reason that lawyers keep volumes of law books and access to legal databases such as lexisnexis, and do not simply use an abridged legal dictionary. Yes they use these books in law school to help gain a primary understanding of the law, but they are not a substitute for a thorough understanding. The ruling itself applies as common law to cases of similar facts (the events/words/actions/funding/whatever else there may be). Your case bears no similarity to lemon v kurtzman. For those of you made squemish by massive walls of text or cut and paste jobs, I apologize for Bricktopping here, but I must:

LEMON ET AL. v. KURTZMAN, SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL.
No. 71-1470
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
411 U.S. 192; 93 S. Ct. 1463; 36 L. Ed. 2d 151; 1973 U.S. LEXIS 85
November 8, 1972, Argued
April 2, 1973, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

DISPOSITION: 348 F.Supp. 300, affirmed.

Time-saving, comprehensive research tool. Includes expanded summary, extensive research and analysis, and links to LexisNexis® content and available court documents.

CASE SUMMARY





CORE TERMS: sectarian, reimbursement, school year, subsidy, religious, secular, nonpublic schools, nonpublic, religion, expenditure, services rendered, entanglement', equitable, decree, educational services, constitutional interests, state statute, retrospective, surveillance, educational, post-audit, injunction, reimburse, enjoined, shaping, church, announced, municipal, statutory scheme, services provided

LexisNexis® Headnotes

Governments > Courts > Judicial Precedents
Governments > Local Governments > Finance


Civil Procedure > Equity > General Overview
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > General Overview


Governments > Courts > Judicial Precedents


Civil Procedure > Equity > General Overview


Civil Procedure > Equity > General Overview
Governments > Local Governments > Administrative Boards


Governments > Legislation > Effect & Operation > Prospective Operation






SUMMARY: In Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602, 29 L Ed 2d 745, 91 S Ct 2105, the United States Supreme Court, reversing a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, held that Pennsylvania's statutory program, enacted in 1968, for reimbursing nonpublic sectarian schools for certain secular educational services violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment because of the excessive entanglement of church and state fostered by the program's requirements as to continuing state scrutiny of the schools' educational programs and state auditing of school accounts, and because of the program's potential involvement in the political process. On remand, the three-judge District Court entered a judgment for the plaintiffs which enjoined payment of state funds under the program only for educational services performed after the date of the Supreme Court decision, but which, over the plaintiffs' objection, permitted the state to reimburse the nonpublic schools for services provided before such date (348 F Supp 300).
On direct appeal, five members of the United States Supreme Court, although not agreeing on an opinion, agreed that the judgment should be affirmed.
Burger, Ch. J., announced the judgment of the court, and in an opinion joined by Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., expressed the view that the District Court had properly permitted the state to reimburse the schools for services rendered prior to the date when the statutory program was declared to be unconstitutional, particularly in view of equitable principles and the totality of the circumstances, including the circumstances that (1) such payments, which involved no further state oversight of the schools, other than the minimal contact of a final audit of school records, would not substantially undermine the constitutional interests at stake, (2) even assuming a cognizable constitutional interest in barring any state payments at all to sectarian schools, the final payments implicated such interest only once, under nonrecurring special circumstances, and the remote possibility of constitutional harm was offset by the schools' reliance on the validity of the statutory program and the promised payments for expenses incurred before the Supreme Court's decision, (3) the plaintiffs had withdrawn their original motion in the District Court for a preliminary injunction against payments under the recently enacted program, and had not thereafter sought to suspend payments during the pendency of the litigation, until after the Supreme Court's decision, and (4) it could not be said that state officials and the schools had acted in bad faith in relying on the statutes, since the Supreme Court's decision that the program was unconstitutional involved an issue of first impression whose resolution could not have been clearly predicted.
White, J., concurred in the judgment.
Douglas, J., joined by Brennan and Stewart, JJ., dissented on the grounds that (1) since it was well established that any public subsidy of parochial schools was unconstitutional, there was clear warning that the statutory program was unconstitutional, and (2) allowing payments under the program, even for past services, violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment.
Marshall, J., did not participate.


LAWYERS' EDITION HEADNOTES:

[***LEdHN1] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §937
state aid to sectarian schools -- federal injunction --
Headnote:
[SUP]LEdHN[1][/SUP][1] Upon remand of a case after the United States Supreme Court, reversing a three-judge Federal District Court decision, held that a state's statutory program to reimburse nonpublic sectarian schools for certain secular educational services violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment, the District Court does not err in entering a judgment for the plaintiffs which enjoins payment of state funds under the program only for educational services performed after the date of the Supreme Court decision, and which permits the state to reimburse the nonpublic schools for services performed before such date.Points From Separate Opinions


[***LEdHN2] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §937
state aid to sectarian schools -- federal injunction --
Headnote:
[SUP]LEdHN[2A][/SUP][2A][SUP]LEdHN[2B][/SUP][2B][SUP]LEdHN[2C][/SUP][2C] Upon remand of a case after the United States Supreme Court, reversing a three-judge Federal District Court decision, held that a state's statutory program to reimburse nonpublic sectarian schools for certain secular educational services violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment because of the excessive entanglement of church and state fostered by the program's requirements as to continuing state scrutiny of the schools' educational programs and state auditing of school accounts, and because of the program's potential involvement in the political process, the District Court, in keeping with equitable principles and in view of the totality of the circumstances, properly enters a judgment for the plaintiffs which enjoins payment of state funds under the program only for educational services performed after the date of the Supreme Court decision, and which permits the state to reimburse the nonpublic schools for services provided before such date, where (1) such distribution of state funds to the schools would not substantially undermine the constitutional interests at stake in the Supreme Court's decision, since payment for past services would compel no further state oversight of the schools' instructional processes, and since the Supreme Court's decision removed any further potential for divisive political conflict as to the program, (2) the state's final post-audit of school records involved only a ministerial function, with a minimal contact of the state with the affairs of the schools, (3) assuming a cognizable constitutional interest in barring any state payments at all to sectarian schools, the final payments implicated such interest only once, under nonrecurring special circumstances, (4) there was no present risk of further significant intrusive administrative entanglement, and the state's past surveillance of the schools assured that state funds would not be applied for sectarian purposes, (5) the remote possibility of constitutional harm from allowing the payments was offset by the schools' reliance on the program and promised payments for expenses incurred before the Supreme Court's decision, (6) denial of such payment for past services would impose a substantial hardship on the schools, (7) the plaintiffs had withdrawn their original motion in the District Court for a preliminary injunction against payments under the recently enacted program, and had not thereafter sought to suspend payments during the pendency of the litigation, until after the Supreme Court's decision, and ( it could not be said that state officials and the schools had acted in bad faith in relying on the statutes, since the Supreme Court's decision that the statutory program was unconstitutional involved an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed and could not have been predicted with assurance sufficient to undermine reliance on the program's validity. [From separate opinion by Burger, Ch. J., Blackmun, J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J. Contra: Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart, JJ.]


[***LEdHN3] COURTS §777.5
decisions -- nonretroactive application --
Headnote:
[SUP]LEdHN[3][/SUP][3] The doctrine of nonretroactivity of judicial decisions, although usually arising with regard to new constitutional developments in the criminal area, also applies outside the criminal area, in both constitutional and nonconstitutional cases. [From separate opinion by Burger, Ch. J., Blackmun, J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J.]


[***LEdHN4] COURTS §777.5
STATUTES §24
judicial decisions -- retroactive effect --
Headnote:
[SUP]LEdHN[4][/SUP][4] The effect of a given constitutional ruling on prior conduct is subject to no set principle of absolute retroactive invalidity but depends upon a consideration of particular relations and particular conduct, of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality, and where statutes are held to be invalid, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and its previous applications; since statutory or even judge-made rules of law are hard facts on which people must rely in making decisions and in shaping their conduct, it is not proper to apply any absolute rule that an unconstitutional statute confers no rights, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and is as inoperative as though it had never been passed. [From separate opinion by Burger, Ch. J., Blackmun, J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J.]


[***LEdHN5] COURTS §777.5
STATUTES §24
judicial decisions -- retroactive effect --
Headnote:
[SUP]LEdHN[5][/SUP][5] The guidelines of the test for determining whether a new constitutional rule of criminal law should be applied in reviewing judgments of conviction obtained under a prior standard--which test embodies a balancing approach looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation--are helpful, but not controlling, in a federal case involving a state statute which was declared to be unconstitutional, and thus presenting a problem relating to the appropriate scope of federal equitable remedies as to enforcement of the statute during the period before it was declared unconstitutional. [From separate opinion by Burger, Ch. J., Blackmun, J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J.]


[***LEdHN6] APPEAL AND ERROR §1366
EQUITY §86
discretionary power -- review --
Headnote:
[SUP]LEdHN[6][/SUP][6] In shaping equity decrees, the trial court is vested with broad discretionary power, and appellate review is correspondingly narrow. [From separate opinion by Burger, Ch. J., Blackmun, J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J.]


[***LEdHN7] EQUITY §87
remedies --
Headnote:
[SUP]LEdHN[7][/SUP][7] In constitutional adjudication as elsewhere, equitable remedies are a special blend of what is necessary, what is fair, and what is workable. [From separate opinion by Burger, Ch. J., Blackmun, J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J.]


[***LEdHN8] EQUITY §87
EQUITY §88
remedies --
Headnote:
[SUP]LEdHN[8][/SUP][8] Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs. [From separate opinion by Burger, Ch. J., Blackmun, J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J.]


[***LEdHN9] EQUITY §87
general principles --
Headnote:
[SUP]LEdHN[9][/SUP][9] In equity as nowhere else courts eschew rigid absolutes and look to the practical realities and necessities inescapably involved in reconciling competing interests, notwithstanding those interests have constitutional roots. [From separate opinion by Burger, Ch. J., Blackmun, J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J.]


[***LEdHN10] EQUITY §87
remedies --
Headnote:
[SUP]LEdHN[10][/SUP][10] Reliance interests weigh heavily in the shaping of an appropriate equitable remedy. [From separate opinion by Burger, Ch. J., Blackmun, J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J.]


[***LEdHN11] OFFICERS §35
power to enforce statutes --
Headnote:
[SUP]LEdHN[11][/SUP][11] State officials charged with executing state legislative directives are not required to stay their hands until there has been an authoritative judicial determination by federal courts that newly enacted state legislation is constitutional. [From separate opinion by Burger, Ch. J., Blackmun, J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J.]


[***LEdHN12] OFFICERS §35
power to enforce statutes --
Headnote:
[SUP]LEdHN[12][/SUP][12] Until judges say otherwise, state officers have the power to carry forward the directives of the state legislature. [From separate opinion by Burger, Ch. J., Blackmun, J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J.]


[***LEdHN13] COURTS §49
OFFICERS §35
political discretion -- judicial review --
Headnote:
[SUP]LEdHN[13][/SUP][13] Although state officials may, in some circumstances, elect to defer acting under state legislation until an authoritative judicial pronouncement of the validity of the legislation has been secured, nevertheless such choice is essentially one of political discretion and one not an incident of judicial review, particularly when there are no fixed and clear constitutional precedents as to the validity of the legislation. [From separate opinion by Burger, Ch. J., Blackmun, J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J.]


[***LEdHN14] EVIDENCE §99.1
presumptions -- validity of statutes --
Headnote:
[SUP]LEdHN[14][/SUP][14] There is a basic presumption of the constitutional validity of a duly enacted state or federal law. [From separate opinion by Burger, Ch. J., Blackmun, J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J.]


[***LEdHN15] INJUNCTION §79.2
state officers -- federal injunction --
Headnote:
[SUP]LEdHN[15][/SUP][15] Federalism requires that federal injunctions against acts of state officers unrelated to state courts must be shaped with concern and care for the responsibilities of the executive and legislative branches of state governments. [From separate opinion by Burger, Ch. J., Blackmun, J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J.]


[***LEdHN16] INJUNCTION §79.2
state officers -- federal injunction --
Headnote:
[SUP]LEdHN[16A][/SUP][16A][SUP]LEdHN[16B][/SUP][16B] The flexible range of federal injunctive powers as to acts of state officers is not to be curtailed so as to permit state officers to proceed with their business regardless of serious constitutional questions concerning state legislation; a significant purpose of tools afforded by federal injunctive powers is to preserve rights of all parties and to confine unnecessary harm during the often protracted pendency of constitutional litigation. [From separate opinion by Burger, Ch. J., Blackmun, J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J.]


[***LEdHN17] OFFICERS §32
STATUTES §1
reliance on statutes --
Headnote:
[SUP]LEdHN[17][/SUP][17] As a general principle, absent contrary judicial direction, state officials and those with whom they deal are entitled to rely on a presumptively valid state statute, enacted in good faith and not plainly unlawful. [From separate opinion by Burger, Ch. J., Blackmun, J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J.]


[***LEdHN18] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §937
First Amendment -- aid to parochial schools --
Headnote:
[SUP]LEdHN[18][/SUP][18] The use of taxpayers' money to support parochial schools violates the First Amendment, made applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. [From separate opinion by Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart, JJ.]


[***LEdHN19] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §937
First Amendment -- aid to parochial schools --
Headnote:
[SUP]LEdHN[19][/SUP][19] Any public subsidy of sectarian schools, regardless of the amount of the subsidy, constitutes an impermissible involvement of secular with religious institutions, violative of the First Amendment. [From separate opinion by Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart, JJ.]


SYLLABUS
Following this Court's invalidation in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (Lemon I) of Pennsylvania's statutory program to reimburse nonpublic sectarian schools (hereafter schools) for secular educational services, the District Court on remand enjoined any payments under the program for services rendered after Lemon I, but permitted Pennsylvania to reimburse the schools for services performed prior to that decision. Appellants challenge the scope of this decree. Held: The judgment is affirmed. Pp. 193-209.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, in an opinion joined by MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, MR. JUSTICE POWELL, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Pennsylvania to reimburse the schools for services rendered and costs incurred in reliance on the statutory scheme prior to its invalidation in Lemon I. Pp. 197-209.
(a) An unconstitutional statute is not absolutely void, but is a practical reality upon which people rely. Courts recognize that reality. Pp. 197-199.
(b) A trial court has wide latitude in shaping an equitable decree and reaching an accommodation between public and private needs. Pp. 200-201.
(c) The contested reimbursement will not contravene the constitutional principle of Lemon I of avoiding the ongoing entanglement of church and state, since only a final, ministerial post-audit is involved and no further detailed state surveillance of the schools is required. At the same time, however, supervision already conducted by Pennsylvania officials insures that the proposed reimbursement will not be used for sectarian purposes. The proposed payment reflects only the schools' expenses incurred in expectation of reimbursement. Pp. 201-202.
(d) The schools relied in good faith on the state statute, which invited the contracts and authorized reimbursement for past services; and appellants, in self-styled "sensible recognition of the practical realities of the situation," may well have encouraged such reliance by the schools by not moving to have the payments enjoined before the contract services had been performed. Pp. 203-205.
(e) The schools could not have anticipated the Lemon I holding, which involved resolution of an issue of first impression that "was not clearly foreshadowed." Pp. 206-207.
(f) A State and those with whom it deals are not to be subjected to harsh, retrospective relief merely because they act on the basis of presumptively valid legislation, in the absence of contrary judicial direction. Pp. 207-209.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurred in the judgment.


COUNSEL: David P. Bruton argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Melvin L. Wulf, Sanford J. Rosen, and Franklin C. Salisbury.

William B. Ball argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief for appellee Commonwealth of Pennsylvania were J. Shane Creamer, Attorney General, Samuel Rappaport, Joseph G. Skelly, James E. Gallagher, Jr., C. Clark Hodgson, Jr., and William D. Valente. Henry T. Reath filed a brief for appellee Pennsylvania Association of Independent Schools.

JUDGES: Burger, C. J., announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. White, J., concurred in the judgment. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Stewart, JJ., joined, post, p. 209. Marshall, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

OPINION BY: BURGER

OPINION
[*193] [***157] [**1466] MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, MR. JUSTICE POWELL, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST join.
On June 28, 1971, we held that the Pennsylvania statutory program to reimburse nonpublic sectarian schools for certain secular educational services violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The case was remanded to the three-judge District Court for further [*194] proceedings consistent with our opinion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (Lemon I). On remand, the District Court entered summary judgment in favor of appellants and enjoined payment, under Act 109, of any state funds to nonpublic sectarian schools for educational services performed after June 28, 1971. The District Court's order permitted the State to reimburse nonpublic sectarian schools for services provided before our decision in Lemon I. Appellants made no claim that appellees refund all sums paid under the Pennsylvania statute [SUP]1[/SUP] struck down in Lemon I.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act, June 19, 1968, No. 109, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 24, §§ 5601-5609 (Supp. 1971).

- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

[***LEdHR1] [SUP]LEdHN[1][/SUP][1] [***LEdHR2A] [SUP]LEdHN[2A][/SUP][2A]Appellants, the successful plaintiffs of Lemon I, now challenge the limited scope of the District Court's injunction. Specifically, they assert that the District Court [***158] erred in refusing to enjoin payment of some $ 24 million set aside by Pennsylvania to compensate nonpublic sectarian schools for educational services rendered by them during the 1970-1971 school year. We noted probable jurisdiction, 406 U.S. 943 (1972), and we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
(1)
The specifics of the Pennsylvania statutory scheme held unconstitutional in Lemon I need be recalled only briefly. Under Act 109, the participating nonpublic schools of Pennsylvania were to be reimbursed by the State for certain educational services provided by the schools pursuant to purchase-of-service contracts with the State. According to the terms of the contracts, the schools were to provide teachers, textbooks, and instructional materials for mathematics, modern foreign language, physical science, and physical education courses -- "secular" courses of instruction. The State was not only to compensate the schools for the services provided, but [*195] also to undertake continuing surveillance of the instructional programs to insure that the services purchased were not provided in connection with "any subject matter expressing religious teaching, or the morals or forms of worship of any sect." See Lemon I, supra, at 609-610.
Under § 5607 of the Act, any nonpublic school seeking reimbursement was to "maintain such accounting procedures, including maintenance of separate funds and accounts pertaining to the cost of secular educational service, as to establish that it actually expended in support of such service an amount of money equal to the amount of money sought in reimbursement." To this end, the school accounts were to be subject to audit by the State Auditor General. Actual payment was to be made by the Superintendent of Public Instruction "in four equal installments payable on the first day of September, December, March and June of the school term following the school term in which the secular educational service was rendered." (Emphasis supplied.)
In Lemon I, we held that, although Act 109 had a secular legislative purpose, the Act fostered "excessive entanglement" of church schools and State through the requirement of ongoing state scrutiny of the educational programs of sectarian schools, the statutory post-audit procedures, and potential involvement in the political process. We [**1467] found it unnecessary to decide whether Act 109 was constitutionally infirm on the additional ground that the "primary effect" of any state payments to church-related schools would be to promote the cause of religion in contravention of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
(2)
Against this backdrop, we turn to the events relevant to this appeal. On June 19, 1968, Act 109 became law. Approximately one month later, appellants publicly declared their intention of challenging the constitutionality [*196] of the new legislation. During the following six months, the State took steps to implement the Act, promulgating regulations and, in January 1969, entering for the first time into service contracts for the 1968-1969 school year (then in progress) with approximately 1,181 nonpublic schools throughout Pennsylvania. [***159] The schools submitted schedules in June 1969, at the conclusion of the 1968-1969 school year, specifying the precise items of expense during that year for which they would seek reimbursement, to be made during the 1969-1970 school year. On June 3, 1969, appellants filed their complaint, asking that Act 109 be declared unconstitutional and its enforcement enjoined.
Simultaneously with their 1969 complaint, appellants filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to restrain the responsible state officials from "paying or processing for paying any funds pursuant to [Act 109]." However, appellants abandoned the request for preliminary relief in a letter of August 28, 1969, from their counsel to Judge Troutman. Appellants, describing their position as a "sensible recognition of the practical realities of the situation, . . . withdrew from any attempt to prevent initial payment to the nonpublic schools scheduled for September 2 [1969]." In the same letter, appellants' counsel mentioned the payments scheduled for December 2, 1969, but in fact no attempt was ever made to enjoin those reimbursements.
On November 29, 1969, a divided District Court granted appellees' motion to dismiss appellants' complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Appellants filed a notice of appeal to this Court on December 17, 1969; at no time before or after probable jurisdiction was noted on April 20, 1970, did appellants move for interlocutory relief pending appeal, even though on January 15, 1970, the schools entered into service contracts with the State for the 1969-1970 school year. [*197] Consequently, the District Court had no occasion to consider the exercise of injunctive power pendente lite.
In September 1970, the schools began performing services for the 1970-1971 school year, compensable under the terms of Act 109; and on January 15, 1971, contracts were entered into for that school year. On June 28, 1971, we held Act 109 unconstitutional and remanded the cause to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. Not until appellants filed their motion for summary judgment, in August 1971, did they first indicate their intention to prevent reimbursement under Act 109 for the services already provided by the schools during the 1970-1971 school year.
(3)

[***LEdHR3] [SUP]LEdHN[3][/SUP][3]Claims that a particular holding of the Court should be applied retroactively have been pressed on us frequently in recent years. Most often, we have been called upon to decide whether a decision defining new constitutional rights of a defendant in a criminal case should be applied to convictions of others that predated the new constitutional development. E. g., Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 [**1468] (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). But "in the last few decades, we have recognized the doctrine of nonretroactivity outside the criminal area many times, in both constitutional and nonconstitutional cases." Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 [***160] (1971); Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (196; Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); England v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). We have approved nonretroactive relief in civil litigation, relating, for example, [*198] to the validity of municipal financing founded upon electoral procedures later declared unconstitutional, Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969), and City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); or to the validity of elections for local officials held under possibly discriminatory voting laws, Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). In each of these cases, the common request was that we should reach back to disturb or to attach legal consequence to patterns of conduct premised either on unlawful statutes or on a different understanding of the controlling judge-made law from the rule that ultimately prevailed.
Appellants urge, as they did in the District Court, a strange amalgam of flexibility and absolutism. Appellants assure us that they do not seek to require the schools to disgorge prior payments received under Act 109; in the same breath, appellants insist that the presently disputed payment be enjoined because an unconstitutional statute "confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886). Conceding that we have receded from Norton in a host of criminal decisions and in other recent constitutional decisions relating to municipal bonds, appellants nevertheless view those precedents as departures from the established norm of Norton. We disagree.

[***LEdHR4] [SUP]LEdHN[4][/SUP][4][SUP]HN1[/SUP]The process of reconciling the constitutional interests reflected in a new rule of law with reliance interests founded upon the old is "among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal . . . ." Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940).Consequently, our holdings in recent years have emphasized that the effect of a given constitutional ruling on prior conduct "is subject to no set 'principle of absolute retroactive [*199] invalidity' but depends upon a consideration of 'particular relations . . . and particular conduct . . . of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality'; and 'of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application.'" Linkletter, supra, at 627, quoting from Chicot County Drainage Dist., supra, at 374. However appealing the logic of Norton may have been in the abstract, its abandonment reflected our recognition that statutory or even judge-made rules of law are hard facts on which people must rely in making decisions and in shaping their conduct. This fact of legal life underpins our modern decisions recognizing a doctrine of nonretroactivity. Appellants offer no persuasive reason for confining the modern approach to those constitutional cases involving criminal procedure or municipal bonds, and we ourselves perceive none.
[***161] [***LEdHR5] [SUP]LEdHN[5][/SUP][5]In Linkletter, the Court suggested a test, often repeated since, embodying the [**1469] recent balancing approach; we looked to "the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." Id., at 629. Those guidelines are helpful, see infra, at 201-203, but the problem of Linkletter and its progeny is not precisely the same as that now before us. Here, we are not considering whether we will apply a new constitutional rule of criminal law in reviewing judgments of conviction obtained under a prior standard; the problem of the instant case is essentially one relating to the appropriate scope of federal equitable remedies, a problem arising from enforcement of a state statute during the period before it had been declared unconstitutional. True, the temporal scope of the injunction has brought the parties back to this Court, and their dispute calls into play values not unlike those underlying Linkletter and its progeny. But however we state the issue, the fact remains that we are asked to reexamine [*200] the District Court's evaluation of the proper means of implementing an equitable decree. Cf. United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 295 (1970); id., at 296-297 (Harlan, J., concurring).

[***LEdHR6] [SUP]LEdHN[6][/SUP][6] [***LEdHR7] [SUP]LEdHN[7][/SUP][7] [***LEdHR8] [SUP]LEdHN[8][/SUP][8][SUP]HN2[/SUP]In shaping equity decrees, the trial court is vested with broad discretionary power; appellate review is correspondingly narrow. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 15, 27 n. 10 (1971). Moreover, in constitutional adjudication as elsewhere, equitable remedies are a special blend of what is necessary, [SUP]2[/SUP] what is fair, and what is workable. "Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs." Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955). MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, speaking for the Court, has said,


"The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and practicality have made [*201] equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as well as between competing private claims." Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-330 [***162] (1944).

See also Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965), the Court recalled Mr. Justice Cardozo's statement that "the federal constitution has no voice upon the subject," citing Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932). In Sunburst, the Court refused to accept the petitioner's contention that "adherence to precedent as establishing a governing rule for the past in respect of the meaning of a statute is . . . a denial of due process when coupled with the declaration of an intention to refuse to adhere to it in adjudicating any controversies growing out of the transactions of the future." Id., at 363-364. Instead, the Court held that "[SUP]HN3[/SUP]A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward." Id., at 364.
Sunburst does not, of course, suggest that we may ignore constitutional interests in deciding whether to attach retrospective effect to a constitutional decision of this Court.


- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***LEdHR9] [SUP]LEdHN[9][/SUP][9][SUP]HN4[/SUP]In equity, as nowhere else, courts eschew rigid absolutes and look to the practical realities and necessities inescapably involved in reconciling competing interests, notwithstanding that those interests have constitutional roots.
(4)
The constitutional fulcrum of Lemon I was the excessive entanglement of church and state fostered by Act 109. [**1470] We found it unnecessary to decide whether the "legislative precautions [of Act 109] restrict the principal or primary effect of the programs to the point where they do not offend the Religion Clauses." 403 U.S., at 613-614. For, as we said of both Act 109 and the similar Rhode Island provision, "[a] comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed . . . . These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church." Id., at 619. We further emphasized the reciprocal threat to First Amendment interests from enmeshing the divisive issue of direct aid to religious schools in the traditional political processes. Id., at 622-624.

[***LEdHR2B] [SUP]LEdHN[2B][/SUP][2B]The sensitive values of the Religion Clauses do not readily lend themselves to quantification but, despite the inescapable imprecision, we think it clear that the proposed distribution of state funds to Pennsylvania's nonpublic sectarian schools will not substantially undermine the constitutional interests at stake in Lemon I. Act 109 required the Superintendent of Public Instruction to ensure [*202] that educational services to be reimbursed by the State were kept free of religious influences. Under the Act, the Superintendent's supervisory task was to have been completed long ago, during the 1970-1971 school year itself; nothing in the record suggests that the Superintendent did not faithfully execute his duties according to law. Hence, payment of the present disputed sums will compel no further state oversight of the instructional processes of sectarian schools. By the same token, since the constitutionality of Act 109 is now settled, there is no further potential for divisive political conflict among the citizens and legislators of Pennsylvania over the desirability or degree of direct state aid to sectarian schools under Act 109.
Two problems having constitutional overtones remain, but their resolution requires no compromise of the basic principles of Lemon I. There is, first, the impact of the single and final post-audit. The record indicates that the post-audit process will involve only a ministerial "cleanup" function, that of balancing expenditures and receipts in the closing accounting -- undertaken only once, and in that setting a minimal contact of the State with the affairs of the schools. Second, there is the question of impinging on the Religion Clauses from the fact of any payment that provides any state assistance or aid to sectarian schools -- the issue we did not reach in Lemon I. Yet even assuming a cognizable constitutional interest in barring any state payments, under [***163] the District Court holding that interest is implicated only once under special circumstances that will not recur. There is no present risk of significant intrusive administrative entanglement, since only a final post-audit remains and detailed state surveillance of the schools is a thing of the past. At the same time, that very process of oversight -- now an accomplished fact -- assures that state funds will not be applied for any sectarian purposes. [SUP]3[/SUP] [*203] [**1471] Finally, as will appear, even this single proposed payment for services long since passing state scrutiny reflects no more than the schools' reliance on promised payment for expenses incurred by them prior to June 28, 1971.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971): "If the government closed its eyes to the manner in which these grants are actually used it would be allowing public funds to promote sectarian education. If it did not close its eyes but undertook the surveillance needed, it would, I fear, intermeddle in parochial affairs in a way that would breed only rancor and dissension." Id., at 640 (DOUGLAS, J., concurring).
"The Court thus creates an insoluble paradox for the State and the parochial schools. The State cannot finance secular instruction if it permits religion to be taught in the same classroom; but if it exacts a promise that religion not be so taught . . . and enforces it, it is then entangled in the 'no entanglement' aspect of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence." Id., at 668 (opinion of WHITE, J.).
Here, the "insoluble paradox" is avoided because the entangling supervision prerequisite to state aid has already been accomplished and need not enter into our present evaluation of the constitutional interests at stake in the proposed payment.


- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

[***LEdHR10] [SUP]LEdHN[10][/SUP][10]Offsetting the remote possibility of constitutional harm from allowing the State to keep its bargain are the expenses incurred by the schools in reliance on the state statute inviting the contracts made and authorizing reimbursement for past services performed by the schools. [SUP]4[/SUP] It is well established that [SUP]HN5[/SUP]reliance interests weigh heavily in the shaping of an appropriate equitable remedy. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). That [*204] there was such reliance by the schools is reflected by a well-supported District Court finding. The District Court found that there was no dispute "that to deny the church-related schools any reimbursement for their services rendered would impose upon them a substantial burden which would be difficult for them to meet." [SUP]5[/SUP] 348 F.Supp. 300, 304-305.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 We agree with the District Court that whether the payments in question constitute payments under valid contracts or a subsidy "makes no difference in our decision." To characterize the payments as subsidies does not "lessen the reliance of the nonpublic schools on the payments or the subsequent hardship upon them if the payments are not made." 348 F.Supp. 300, 304 n. 6.5 The District Court's comment, in turn, reflects the following colloquy between that court and counsel for appellants, at the December 15, 1971, hearing after remand from this Court: "MR. SAWYER: I am perfectly willing to concede -- and I think I must here; we have taken no evidence -- that there was reliance. And I would like to state, so there is no question about that, that I am assuming there was reliance. I think as a practical matter, however, the schools continued to do what they were doing before.
"JUDGE HASTIE: Reliance in the sense, I assume, of determining activities and expenditures in anticipation that this amount would be reimbursed?
"MR. SAWYER: I know of a school that escrowed it, but I would think that would be rare. And I have to live with that, I think, unless I want to be prepared to go ahead and ask to take testimony and try to prove that wasn't so. . . ."


- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - The [***164] significance of appellee schools' reliance is reinforced by the fact that appellants' tactical choice not to press for interim injunctive suspension of payments or contracts during the pendency of the Lemon I litigation may well have encouraged the appellee schools to incur detriments in reliance upon reimbursement by the State under Act 109. In June 1969, appellants initiated the litigation that culminated in Lemon I. Though initially appellants moved for a preliminary injunction to block the September 1969 payment of funds for services rendered during the 1968-1969 school year, for reasons of their own appellants withdrew the request. Funds were paid in September and December 1969, and in March and June 1970. In 1970, the State entered [*205] into new contracts with the nonpublic schools; appellants took no steps to block the making of these contracts or to prevent the State from disbursing funds, in September and December 1970, or March and June 1971, for services rendered during the 1969-1970 school year. Appellants, meanwhile, had filed a notice of appeal to this Court by the time the distribution of funds for the 1969-1970 school year began. It was only after our decision in Lemon I -- six months after the contracts for the 1970-1971 school year were perfected and after all services under those contracts had been performed -- that appellants asserted their intention to block the payments due, beginning in the fall of 1971. Thus, for nearly two years, the State and the schools proceeded to act on the assumption that appellants would continue to adhere to a "sensible recognition of the practical realities of the situation."
[**1472] There has been no demonstration by the appellee schools of the precise amount of any detriment incurred by them during the 1970-1971 school year in the expectation of reimbursement by the State. The complexity of such a determination for each of Pennsylvania's 1,181 nonpublic schools that contracted with the State under Act 109 is readily apparent. [SUP]6[/SUP] But we need not [*206] dwell on the matter of uncertainty. On this record the District Court could reasonably find reliance on the part of the appellee schools and reasonably could conclude that no more was needed to demonstrate retrospectively the degree of their reliance.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 As to each school, the determination of actual reliance would be subtle, premised largely on credibility and not on facts of record. Nonreliance could not be assumed simply because expenditure levels remained constant before and after Act 109; any school might well assert that it would have reduced its educational expenditures in some particular but for the expectation of compensation for certain other expenditures incurred in connection with Act 109. Similarly, the inquiry could not be limited to expenditures for those items specified by the Act. Increased expenditures for any of the gamut of a school's activities might have been incurred in reliance on reimbursement for services covered by Act 109.

- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - It is argued, though, that the schools were foolhardy to rely on any reimbursement by the State whatever, in view of the constitutional cloud over the Pennsylvania program from the outset. We conclude, however, that our holding in Lemon I "decid[ed] an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S., at 106. A three-judge district court, with one dissent, upheld Act 109. Soon after, another three-judge district court in Rhode Island [***165] held unconstitutional the Rhode Island statutory scheme we considered together with Pennsylvania's program in Lemon I. Nor were district courts alone in disagreement over the constitutionality of Lemon-style plans to provide financial assistance to sectarian schools. This Court was itself divided when the issue was ultimately resolved after full briefing and argument. And the Court acknowledged "that we can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law." Lemon I, 403 U.S., at 612. [SUP]7[/SUP]

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7 According to the dissent, appellees can "tender no considerations of equity" because they had "clear warning" that they were "treading on unconstitutional ground." The apparent premise for this assertion is the view that the Establishment Clause forbids any and all use of tax moneys to "support" or to "subsidize" sectarian schools. Yet the Court's decisions, prior to and at the time of Lemon I, shied away from this sweeping application of the Establishment Clause, favoring instead particularized analysis of state involvement in religious schools, with the analysis based upon the facts and circumstances before us. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 242-243 (196; Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 14 (1947). There is, then, no basis for the dissent's suggestion that the Court has been "unequivocal" in proscribing all state assistance to religious schools.

- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [*207] That there would be constitutional attack on Act 109 was plain from the outset. But this is not a case where it could be said that appellees acted in bad faith or that they relied on a plainly unlawful statute. In this case, even the clarity of hindsight is not persuasive that the constitutional resolution of Lemon I could be predicted with assurance sufficient to undermine appellees' reliance on Act 109.
(5)
In the end, then, appellants' position comes down to this: that any reliance whatever by the schools was unjustified because Act 109 was an "untested" state statute whose validity had never been authoritatively determined. The short answer to this argument is that governments must act if they are to fulfill their high responsibilities. As one scholar has observed, the diverse state [**1473] governments were preserved by the Framers "as separate sources of authority and organs of administration -- a point on which they hardly had a choice." H. Wechsler, Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law 50 (1961).
[***LEdHR11] [SUP]LEdHN[11][/SUP][11] [***LEdHR12] [SUP]LEdHN[12][/SUP][12] [***LEdHR13] [SUP]LEdHN[13][/SUP][13] [***LEdHR14] [SUP]LEdHN[14][/SUP][14]Appellants ask, in effect, that we hold those charged with executing state legislative directives to the peril of having their arrangements unraveled if they act before there has been an authoritative judicial determination that the governing legislation is constitutional. Appellants would have state officials stay their hands until newly enacted state programs are "ratified" by the federal courts, or risk draconian, retrospective decrees should the legislation fall. In our view, appellants' position [*208] could seriously undermine the initiative of state legislators and executive officials alike. Until judges say otherwise, state officers -- the officers of Pennsylvania -- have the power to carry forward the directives of the state legislature. Those officials may, in some circumstances, elect to defer acting until an authoritative judicial pronouncement has been secured; but particularly when there are no fixed and clear constitutional precedents, the choice is essentially one of political [***166] discretion and one this Court has never conceived as an incident of judicial review. We do not engage lightly in post hoc evaluation of such political judgment, founded as it is on "one of the first principles of constitutional adjudication -- the basic presumption of the constitutional validity of a duly enacted state or federal law." San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, ante, p. 1, at 60 (1973) (STEWART, J., concurring).

[***LEdHR2C] [SUP]LEdHN[2C][/SUP][2C] [***LEdHR15] [SUP]LEdHN[15][/SUP][15] [***LEdHR16A] [SUP]LEdHN[16A][/SUP][16A] [***LEdHR17] [SUP]LEdHN[17][/SUP][17]Federalism suggests that federal court intervention in state judicial processes be appropriately confined. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and companion cases. Likewise, federalism requires that federal injunctions unrelated to state courts be shaped with concern and care for the responsibilities of the executive and legislative branches of state governments. [SUP]8[/SUP] In short, the propriety of the relief afforded appellants by the District Court, applying familiar equitable principles, must be measured against the totality of circumstances and in light of the general principle that, [SUP]HN6[/SUP]absent contrary direction, [*209] state officials and those with whom they deal are entitled to rely on a presumptively valid state statute, enacted in good faith and by no means plainly unlawful.
[***LEdHR16B] [SUP]LEdHN[16B][/SUP][16B]

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8 This is not to say, of course, that the flexible range of federal injunctive powers should be curtailed so as to permit state officers to proceed with their business regardless of serious constitutional questions concerning state legislation. Indeed, a significant purpose of these tools is to preserve rights of all parties and to minimize unnecessary harm during the often protracted pendency of constitutional litigation.

- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurs in the judgment.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


DISSENT BY: DOUGLAS

DISSENT
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE STEWART concur, dissenting.
There is as much a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment whether the payment from public funds to sectarian schools involves last year, the current year, or next year. Madison in his Remonstrance stated: "The same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment . . . ." [SUP]1[/SUP]

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 2 Writings of James Madison 183, 186 (G. Hunt ed. 1901). The Remonstrance is reprinted in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 63 (Rutledge, J., dissenting), and in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 719 (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting).

- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Whether the grant is for teaching last year or at the present time, taxpayers are forced to contribute to sectarian schools a part of their tax dollars.


[**1474] [***LEdHR18] [SUP]LEdHN[18][/SUP][18]The ban on that practice is not new. Lemon I, 403 U.S. 602, did not announce a change in the law. We had announced over and over again that the use of taxpayers' money to support parochial schools violates the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth.
We said in unequivocal words in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16: "No tax in any amount, [*210] large or small, can be levied [***167] to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion." We reiterated the same idea in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314, in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 443, and in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 493. We repeated the same idea in McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 210, and added that a State's tax-supported public schools could not be used "for the dissemination of religious doctrines" nor could a State provide the church "pupils for their religious classes through use of the State's compulsory public school machinery." Id., at 212.

[***LEdHR19] [SUP]LEdHN[19][/SUP][19]MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN in his separate opinion in Lemon I put the matter succinctly when he said,


"For more than a century, the consensus, enforced by legislatures and courts with substantial consistency, has been that public subsidy of sectarian schools constitutes an impermissible involvement of secular with religious institutions." 403 U.S. 642, 648-649.
So there was clear warning that those who proposed such subsidies were treading on unconstitutional ground. They can tender no considerations of equity that should allow them to profit from their unconstitutional venture.
The issues presented in this type of case are often caught up in political strategies, designed to turn judicial or legislative minorities into majorities. Lawyers planning trial strategies are familiar with those tactics. But those who use them and lose have no equities that make constitutional what has long been declared to be unconstitutional. From the days of Madison, the issue of subsidy has never been a question of the amount of the subsidy but rather a principle of no subsidy at all.
[*211] The problem of retroactivity involved in criminal cases is therefore inapplicable. There the question is whether the newly announced rule goes to the fairness of the trial that had been completed under the old rule. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 726-729. Here there is no new rule supplanting an old rule. The rule of no subsidy has been the dominant one since the days of Madison. We deal with the normal situation that governs judicial decisions. Normally they determine legal rights and obligations with respect to events that have already transpired. By definition, courts decide disputes that have already arisen. A losing litigant has no equity in the fact that he "relied" on advice that turned out to be unreliable or wrong. [SUP]2[/SUP] A decision overruling a prior authority may at times deny a litigant due process if applied retroactively. See Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673. Only a compelling circumstance [**1475] has been held to limit a judicial ruling to prospective applications. The disruptive effect in criminal law enforcement is one example. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300. [***168] Likewise, a ruling on the legality of municipal bonds has been given only prospective application where many prior bonds had been issued in good faith on a contrary assumption. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 213-215.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 The rule of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, which rejected Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, was given retrospective effect. We said, "The element of reliance is not persuasive, for Delli Paoli has been under attack from its inception and many courts have in fact rejected it." Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 295.

- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Retroactivity of the decision in Lemon I goes to the very core of the integrity of the judicial process. Constitutional principles do not ride on the effervescent arguments advanced by those seeking to obtain unconstitutional [*212] subsidies. The happenstance of litigation is no criterion for dispensing these unconstitutional subsidies. No matter the words used for the apologia, the subsidy today given to sectarian schools out of taxpayers' monies exceeds by far the "three pence" which Madison condemned in his Remonstrance.
I would reverse the judgment below and adhere to the constitutional principle announced in Lemon I.


REFERENCES
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law 336-340; Am Jur, Schools (1st ed 222)

7 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev ed), Constitutional Law, Forms 2, 3, 17; 18 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms, Schools, Form 18:152

US L Ed Digest, Constitutional Law 937

ALR Digests, Constitutional Law 798

L Ed Index to Anno, Religion and Religious Matters; Retrospective Operation; Schools

ALR Quick Index, Religion and Religious Matters; Retroactive Operation; Schools

Federal Quick Index, Freedom of Religion; Private or Parochial Schools; Retroactive Operation

Annotation References:

United States Supreme Court's views as to retroactive effect of its own decisions announcing new rules. 22 L Ed 2d 821.

Provisions of Federal Constitution concerning establishment and freedom of religion. 96 L Ed 968, 6 L Ed 2d 1394, 21 L Ed 2d 928.

Furnishing free textbooks to sectarian school or student therein. 93 ALR2d 986.

Contract to pay for services or reimburse expenditures as within constitutional inhibition of aid to sectarian institutions. 22 ALR 1319, 55 ALR 320.

Totoe said:

Why would I look into that shit when I can access the case itself. You realize these types of publications are the equivalent of a "law for dummies" book, right?

Click to expand...

Oh my god, this is perfect. You have no idea how stupid this post of yours is. Black's Law dictionary IS NOT the equivalent of "Law for dummies". I'm not even going to explain this to you, I'm just gonna wait for you to look up Black's law, then slap yourself in the forehead Wow, I can't believe how perfect your post was

Dude, I have blacks law. It is no substitute for having the actual cases. It is a handbook for terminology and abbreviations of the acual case. This is a more appropriate analogy, blacks is cliffs notes (good, handy even, but does not fully cover the subject material) the actual case is the novel.