Police Break The Law, Marijuana in Texas

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Finshaggy

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
Huey Newton V The People, and Similar cases:

Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935)
People v. Newton (1970)
Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973)
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992)
United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000).
Uttecht v. Brown 551 U.S. 1 (2007)

"It is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a state has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which, in truth, is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a state to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation."

In Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U. S. 213, 215-216, we phrased the rule in broader terms:

"Petitioner's papers are inexpertly drawn, but they do set forth allegations that his imprisonment resulted from perjured testimony, knowingly used by the State authorities to obtain his conviction, and from the deliberate suppression by those same authorities of evidence favorable to him. These allegations sufficiently charge a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and, if proven, would entitle petitioner to release from his present custody. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103. "


"We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." Ch. 40 of the 1215 Magna Carta, a portion of ch. 29 of the 1225 reissue. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223-24 (1967).

The principle of Mooney v. Holohan is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor, but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted, but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly. An inscription on the walls of the Department of Justice states the proposition candidly for the federal domain: "The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts."

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Gonzales v. Beto, 405 U.S. 1052 (1972).
 
Finshaggy

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
It violates the Equal Protection Clause to exclude African Americans from grand and petit juries, Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972), whether defendant is or is not an African American, Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), and exclusion of potential jurors because of their national ancestry is unconstitutional, at least where defendant is of that ancestry as well, Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).

In the exercise of its supervisory power over the federal courts, the Court has permitted any defendant to challenge the arbitrary exclusion from jury service of his own or any other class. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 83-87 (1942); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946). In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), and Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), male defendants were permitted to challenge the exclusion of women as a Sixth Amendment violation. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965).

Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474 (1953). In Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), and Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565 (1948), the Court in 5-to-4 decisions upheld state use of "blue ribbon" juries from which particular groups, such as laborers and women, had been excluded.

Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (Mexican-American defendant successfully made out prima facie case of intentional exclusion of persons of his ethnic background by showing a substantial underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans based on a comparison of the group's proportion in the total population of eligible jurors to the proportion called, and this in the face of the fact that Mexican-Americans controlled the selection process).

Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377 (1956) (attempted bribe of a juror reported by him to authorities); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) (during trial one of the jurors had been actively seeking employment in the District Attorney's office).

E.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). Exposure of the jurors to knowledge about the defendant's prior criminal record and activities is not alone sufficient to establish a presumption of reversible prejudice, but on voir dire jurors should be questioned about their ability to judge impartially. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975). The Court indicated that under the same circumstances in a federal trial it would have overturned the conviction pursuant to its supervisory power. Id. at 797-98, citing Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959). Essentially, the defendant must make a showing of prejudice which the court then may inquire into. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 575, 581 (1981); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215-18 (1982); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984).

Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954). See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965) (placing jury in charge of two deputy sheriffs who were principal prosecution witnesses at defendant's jury trial denied him his right to an impartial jury); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (influence on jury by prejudiced bailiff). Cf. Gonzales v. Beto, 405 U.S. 1052 (1972).

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (felony); Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971) (misdemeanor). Important factors to be considered, however, include the size and characteristics of the community in which the crime occurred; whether the publicity was blatantly prejudicial; the time elapsed between the publicity and the trial; and whether the jurors' verdict supported the theory of prejudice. Skilling v. U.S., 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).

Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 545 (1968). The Witherspoon case was given added significance when in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), the Court held mandatory death sentences unconstitutional and ruled that the jury as a representative of community mores must make the determination as guided by legislative standards. See also Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980) (holding Witherspoon applicable to bifurcated capital sentencing procedures and voiding a statute permitting exclusion of any juror unable to swear that the existence of the death penalty would not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact)
 
Finshaggy

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
If you ever get even just a regular traffic ticket, accept it when the cop gives it to you, but take it to trial every single time. And Plea under Rule 5.1, which means you are challenging the law with the constitution. Bring a copy of Rule 5.1 printed out for the judge, then let them know that you are to be presumed Innocent, maybe have something ready for the judge to show them your 5th and 14th amendment rights, along with Coffin V United States (1895), and the 9th Amendment which states:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the People.
And make them prove everything beyond a reasonable doubt and in completion.
Forma Papauris basically means 'as a poor person' and you are just asking the court to recognize that you can't pay the other parties court fines.

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1SuE-gmBwPLUj4kNDM8jg7NsgkBFrX9o5oDaELv5sZf0/edit?usp=sharing
 
Finshaggy

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
If anyone does not know how the Controlled Substances Act was written, read this:
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/395/6/

That case was the very last case tried under the Marijuana Tax Act. It was a case where Timothy Leary was arrested at the border when he forgot that he had Marijuana from New York in his car, and for some unrelated reason, he was denied access to Mexico that day and searched on his way back in to the United States. He was arrested for not stating that he was in possession of Marijuana, or the nature of his Marijuana business and for not having a tax stamp when crossing the border with it.

In court he argued that the law was unconstitutional according to his 5th Amendment rights, because if he had declared he had had Marijuana whether at the border or at a Government office (in order to get a tax stamp) they would have arrested him, meaning that he would have to incriminate himself either by declaring his possession of Marijuana or by bringing it to the Government office. This was found by the Supreme Court to be in violation of his 5th Amendment Right to not incriminate himself and not only was the charge dropped, the entire law was overturned because the wording was unconstitutional.

The Controlled Substances Act was written in response to this, but during the time between the overturning of the law and the writing of the new one, Marijuana was completely legal.

And if someone challenges the Controlled Substances Act with the 21st Amendment, it could happen again.
 
Finshaggy

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States143 U.S. 457 (1892)

It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers. This has been often asserted, and the reports are full of cases illustrating its application. This is not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator, for frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act. As said in Plowden 205:

"From which cases it appears that the sages of the law heretofore have construed statutes quite contrary to the letter in some appearance, and those statutes which comprehend all things in the letter they have expounded to extend to but some things, and those which generally prohibit all people from doing such an act they have interpreted to permit some people to do it, and those which include every person in the letter they have adjudged to reach to some persons only, which expositions have always been founded upon the intent of the legislature, which they have collected sometimes by considering the cause and necessity of making the act, sometimes by comparing one part of the act with another, and sometimes by foreign circumstances."
 
Finshaggy

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
If anyone knows anyone in jail for Marijuana, I can help. Or if you know anyone in jail for anything I can help. I studied the law for like 5 years and I know a ton of stuff about all the Constitutional rights in court and many of their intricacies. 4th Amendment, 5th Amendment, etc.
 
Finshaggy

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE


TITLE 5. GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY


CHAPTER 110. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM



Sec. 110.001. DEFINITIONS. (a) In this chapter:

(1) "Free exercise of religion" means an act or refusal to act that is substantially motivated by sincere religious belief. In determining whether an act or refusal to act is substantially motivated by sincere religious belief under this chapter, it is not necessary to determine that the act or refusal to act is motivated by a central part or central requirement of the person's sincere religious belief.

(2) "Government agency" means:

(A) this state or a municipality or other political subdivision of this state; and

(B) any agency of this state or a municipality or other political subdivision of this state, including a department, bureau, board, commission, office, agency, council, or public institution of higher education.

(b) In determining whether an interest is a compelling governmental interest under Section 110.003, a court shall give weight to the interpretation of compelling interest in federal case law relating to the free exercise of religion clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.


Added by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Aug. 30, 1999.




Sec. 110.002. APPLICATION. (a) This chapter applies to any ordinance, rule, order, decision, practice, or other exercise of governmental authority.

(b) This chapter applies to an act of a government agency, in the exercise of governmental authority, granting or refusing to grant a government benefit to an individual.

(c) This chapter applies to each law of this state unless the law is expressly made exempt from the application of this chapter by reference to this chapter.


Added by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Aug. 30, 1999.




Sec. 110.003. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM PROTECTED. (a) Subject to Subsection (b), a government agency may not substantially burden a person's free exercise of religion.

(b) Subsection (a) does not apply if the government agency demonstrates that the application of the burden to the person:

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.

(c) A government agency that makes the demonstration required by Subsection (b) is not required to separately prove that the remedy and penalty provisions of the law, ordinance, rule, order, decision, practice, or other exercise of governmental authority that imposes the substantial burden are the least restrictive means to ensure compliance or to punish the failure to comply.


Added by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Aug. 30, 1999.



110.003 may assert that violation as a defense in a judicial or administrative proceeding without regard to whether the proceeding is brought in the name of the state or by any other person.


Added by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Aug. 30, 1999.




Sec. 110.005. REMEDIES. (a) Any person, other than a government agency, who successfully asserts a claim or defense under this chapter is entitled to recover:

(1) declaratory relief under Chapter 37;

(2) injunctive relief to prevent the threatened violation or continued violation;

(3) compensatory damages for pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses; and

(4) reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and other reasonable expenses incurred in bringing the action.

(b) Compensatory damages awarded under Subsection (a)(3) may not exceed $10,000 for each entire, distinct controversy, without regard to the number of members or other persons within a religious group who claim injury as a result of the government agency's exercise of governmental authority. A claimant is not entitled to recover exemplary damages under this chapter.

(c) An action under this section must be brought in district court.

(d) A person may not bring an action for damages or declaratory or injunctive relief against an individual, other than an action brought against an individual acting in the individual's official capacity as an officer of a government agency.

(e) This chapter does not affect the application of Section 498.0045 or 501.008, Government Code, or Chapter 14 of this code.


Added by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Aug. 30, 1999.
 
Finshaggy

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
42 U.S. Code § 2000bb - Congressional findings and declaration of purposes
(a) FindingsThe Congress finds that—
(1)
the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution;
494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and
(5)
the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.
374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and
Pub. L. 103–141, § 2, Nov. 16, 1993, 107 Stat. 1488.)


42 U.S. Code § 2000bb–1 - Free exercise of religion protected
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.

(b) ExceptionGovernment may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—
(1)
is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2)
is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
(c) Judicial relief
A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article III of the Constitution.

(Pub. L. 103–141, § 3, Nov. 16, 1993, 107 Stat. 1488.)


42 U.S. Code § 2000bb–2 - Definitions
As used in this chapter—
(1)
the term “government” includes a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United States, or of a covered entity;
(2)
the term “covered entity” means the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and each territory and possession of the United States;
section 2000cc–5 of this title.
(Pub. L. 103–141, § 5, Nov. 16, 1993, 107 Stat. 1489; Pub. L. 106–274, § 7(a), Sept. 22, 2000, 114 Stat. 806.)


42 U.S. Code § 2000bb–3 - Applicability
(a) In general
This chapter applies to all Federal law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after November 16, 1993.

Pub. L. 103–141, § 6, Nov. 16, 1993, 107 Stat. 1489; Pub. L. 106–274, § 7(b), Sept. 22, 2000, 114 Stat. 806.)
 
Finshaggy

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
42 U.S. Code § 2000cc–2 - Judicial relief
(a) Cause of action
A person may assert a violation of this chapter as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article III of the Constitution.

(b) Burden of persuasion
If a plaintiff produces prima facie evidence to support a claim alleging a violation of the Free Exercise Clause or a violation of section 2000cc of this title, the government shall bear the burden of persuasion on any element of the claim, except that the plaintiff shall bear the burden of persuasion on whether the law (including a regulation) or government practice that is challenged by the claim substantially burdens the plaintiff’s exercise of religion.

section 2000cc of this title in a non-Federal forum shall not be entitled to full faith and credit in a Federal court unless the claimant had a full and fair adjudication of that claim in the non-Federal forum.

(d) Omitted
(e) Prisoners
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to amend or repeal the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (including provisions of law amended by that Act).

(f) Authority of United States to enforce this chapter
The United States may bring an action for injunctive or declaratory relief to enforce compliance with this chapter. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to deny, impair, or otherwise affect any right or authority of the Attorney General, the United States, or any agency, officer, or employee of the United States, acting under any law other than this subsection, to institute or intervene in any proceeding.

(g) Limitation
If the only jurisdictional basis for applying a provision of this chapter is a claim that a substantial burden by a government on religious exercise affects, or that removal of that substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes, the provision shall not apply if the government demonstrates that all substantial burdens on, or the removal of all substantial burdens from, similar religious exercise throughout the Nation would not lead in the aggregate to a substantial effect on commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes.

(Pub. L. 106–274, § 4, Sept. 22, 2000, 114 Stat. 804.)



42 U.S. Code § 2000cc–3 - Rules of construction
(a) Religious belief unaffected
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize any government to burden any religious belief.

(b) Religious exercise not regulated
Nothing in this chapter shall create any basis for restricting or burdening religious exercise or for claims against a religious organization including any religiously affiliated school or university, not acting under color of law.

(c) Claims to funding unaffected
Nothing in this chapter shall create or preclude a right of any religious organization to receive funding or other assistance from a government, or of any person to receive government funding for a religious activity, but this chapter may require a government to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise.

(d) Other authority to impose conditions on funding unaffectedNothing in this chapter shall—
(1)
authorize a government to regulate or affect, directly or indirectly, the activities or policies of a person other than a government as a condition of receiving funding or other assistance; or
(2)
restrict any authority that may exist under other law to so regulate or affect, except as provided in this chapter.
(e) Governmental discretion in alleviating burdens on religious exercise
A government may avoid the preemptive force of any provision of this chapter by changing the policy or practice that results in a substantial burden on religious exercise, by retaining the policy or practice and exempting the substantially burdened religious exercise, by providing exemptions from the policy or practice for applications that substantially burden religious exercise, or by any other means that eliminates the substantial burden.

(f) Effect on other law
With respect to a claim brought under this chapter, proof that a substantial burden on a person’s religious exercise affects, or removal of that burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes, shall not establish any inference or presumption that Congress intends that any religious exercise is, or is not, subject to any law other than this chapter.

(g) Broad construction
This chapter shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.

(h) No preemption or repeal
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to preempt State law, or repeal Federal law, that is equally as protective of religious exercise as, or more protective of religious exercise than, this chapter.

(i) Severability
If any provision of this chapter or of an amendment made by this chapter, or any application of such provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this chapter, the amendments made by this chapter, and the application of the provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected.

(Pub. L. 106–274, § 5, Sept. 22, 2000, 114 Stat. 805.)



42 U.S. Code § 2000cc–5 - Definitions
In this chapter:
(1) Claimant
The term “claimant” means a person raising a claim or defense under this chapter.

(2) Demonstrates
The term “demonstrates” means meets the burdens of going forward with the evidence and of persuasion.

(3) Free Exercise Clause
The term “Free Exercise Clause” means that portion of the first amendment to the Constitution that proscribes laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion.

(4) GovernmentThe term “government”—
(A) means—
(i)
a State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity created under the authority of a State;
(ii)
any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity listed in clause (i); and
(iii)
any other person acting under color of State law; and
(B)
for the purposes of sections 2000cc–2(b) and 2000cc–3 of this title, includes the United States, a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of the United States, and any other person acting under color of Federal law.
(5) Land use regulation
The term “land use regulation” means a zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development of land (including a structure affixed to land), if the claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other property interest in the regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such an interest.

section 2000d–4a of this title.

(7) Religious exercise
(A) In general
The term “religious exercise” includes any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.

(B) Rule
The use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or intends to use the property for that purpose.

(Pub. L. 106–274, § 8, Sept. 22, 2000, 114 Stat. 806.)
 
Finshaggy

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
And here are some important Supreme Court Cases that support my position.


Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/544/03-9877/index.pdf

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/508/520/case.html

Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal546 U.S. 418 (2006)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/546/04-1084/index.pdf

Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States143 U.S. 457 (1892)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/143/457/case.html

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. ___ (2014)
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/13-354_olp1.pdf

Sherbert v. Verner374 U.S. 398 (1963)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/374/398/case.html

Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec. Div.450 U.S. 707 (1981)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/450/707/case.html



Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/403/388/case.html

Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (1992)

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/506/56/

Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013)

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/569/11-564/
 
mr sunshine

mr sunshine

Well-Known Member
Finshaggy said:
If anyone knows anyone in jail for Marijuana, I can help. Or if you know anyone in jail for anything I can help. I studied the law for like 5 years and I know a ton of stuff about all the Constitutional rights in court and many of their intricacies. 4th Amendment, 5th Amendment, etc.
Click to expand...
The law offices of finns&shaggy. You know soo many things, You're like a fucking va-genius.
 
Finshaggy

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
here are some Texas cases that Reinforce the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.

Cruz v. Beto 405 U.S. 319 (1972)


Robert Soto V Robert Hunt (5th Cir. 2015)

Mayfield v. TDCJ, 529 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 2008)

Paston Rick Barr and Philemon Homes, Inc. V City of Sinton (5th Cir. 2007)

A.A. v. Needville Independent School District (5th Cir. 2010)

Sossamon v. Texas 563 U.S. ___ (2011) (Rose to the US Supreme Court)

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Rose to the US Supreme Court)
 
Finshaggy

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
a list of Writs.

  • The writ of habeas corpus, usually used to test the legality of a prisoner's detention, has expressly been preserved. It is explicitly mentioned in the United States Constitution (Art. 1, § 9, cl. 2[4]). In the United States federal courts, the writ is most often used to review the constitutionality of criminal convictions rendered by state courts. The writ's application does not stop there, the Supreme Court has held the writ of habeas corpus open to all individuals held by the federal government, including Guantanamo Bay detainees. See Boumediene v. Bush.
  • Some courts have held that in rare circumstances in a federal criminal case, a United States district court may use the common-law writ of error coram nobis under the All Writs Act to set aside a conviction when no other remedy is available.
  • The United States district courts normally follow state- in the United States federal courts but are almost never used in practice. In modern times, the All Writs Act is most commonly used as authority for federal courts to issue injunctions to protect their jurisdiction or effectuate their judgments.

The "prerogative" writs are a subset of the class of writs, those that are to be heard ahead of any other cases on a court's docket except other such writs. The most common of the other such prerogative writs are habeas corpus, quo warranto, prohibito, mandamus, procedendo, and certiorari.

  • A writ of audita querela inhibits the unconscionable use of a lawful judgment because of matters arising subsequent to the judgment.
  • A writ of capias directs an officer to take into custody the person named in the writ or order[5]
  • A writ of coram nobis corrects a previous error "of the most fundamental character" to "achieve justice" where "no other remedy" is available, e.g., when a judgment was rendered without full knowledge of the facts.
  • A writ of elegit orders the seizure of a portion of a debtor's lands and all his goods (except work animals) towards satisfying a creditor, until the debt is paid off.
  • A writ of error is issued by an appellate court, and directs a lower court of record to submit its record of the case laid for appeal.[6]
  • A writ of exigent (or exigend) commands a sheriff to summon a defendant indicted for a felony, who had failed to appear in court, to deliver himself up upon pain of outlawry or forfeiture of his goods.
  • A writ of fieri facias (a/k/a "fi fa") commands a sheriff to take and auction off enough property from a losing party to pay the debt (plus interest and costs) owed by a judgment debtor.[7]
  • A writ of mittimus orders either (1) a court to send its record to another or (2) a jailor to receive the accused in his or her custody at any point during the investigative or trial process.
  • A writ of ne exeat restrains a defendant from fleeing the country or jurisdiction.
  • A writ of praemunire instructs a sheriff to order someone to appear in court to answer for any of a number of different crimes.
  • A writ of supersedeas contains a command to stay the proceedings at law.[8]
 
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